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Abstract 
This article looks into the role of injunctive relief in tort law. More specifically, it focuses on the role of 
injunction in cases concerning wrongful risk-taking behaviour (as opposed to intentional or deliberate 
wrongdoing). Although there seems to be little practical experience with injunctive relief in cases of wrongful 
risk-taking behaviour, both the dogmatic and practical implications of allowing or rejecting such claims are 
formidable. By granting petitions for injunctive relief, courts effectively convert ex post claims for 
compensation into primary duties to act or omit. By contrast, rejecting injunctive relief renders tort law rules 
into mere taxes on wrongful behaviour. Which of these two routes is chosen by courts and legislators and 
how forceful are the arguments used to support either choice?  
The aim of this paper is twofold: firstly, to gain a better understanding of the French, German and English 
legal systems with respect to the role of injunction in tort law and secondly, by drawing on the comparative 
analysis, to identify the implications of allowing and rejecting injunctive relief for the understanding of tort 
law. If indeed the role of injunctive relief in cases of wrongful risk-taking behaviour sheds light on tort law’s 
ends, then perhaps a threefold conception of tort law is in order.  
 
Keywords: Injunction, ex post remedy, tort of negligence, duty of care, rights-based tort law 
JEL Classifications: K13, K41
                                                                
 Willem van Boom is professor of private law at the Rotterdam Institute of Private Law, Erasmus University Rotterdam, 
the Netherlands. This article was completed in February 2010; developments after that date have not been included. 
The author wishes to express his gratitude to Benoit Allemeersch, Caroline Cauffman, Siewert Lindenbergh and the 
anonymous reviewer, and the participants of the Ius Commune November 2009 Workshop for stimulating discussion 
and helpful comments. 
 www.professorvanboom.eu  2 
 
§ 1. The notorious Lucius Veratius 
[11] Over the centuries, the case of Lucius Veratius has been the subject of some debate among lawyers.
1
 
The law of the Twelve Tables provided that the private penalty for causing injury to a person was 25 as. The 
cruel and abundantly rich Lucius Veratius derived much pleasure from going out into the streets, followed 
by his slave who carried a money purse, and indiscriminately hitting innocent passers-by. Lucius would 
instantly compensate his victims, thus fully complying with his legal duties. Is this the way tort law should 
work? The case of Lucius Veranus poses pertinent questions and unsurprisingly lawyers through the 
centuries have asked themselves whether this outcome was fair and just, whether tort law should be 
considered merely as a tariff or tax on wrongful behaviour instead of a set of rules with preventive 
aspirations that provides for some remedy that would actually help to prevent or stop the likes of Lucius in 
their hitting sprees.  
Obviously, from a perspective of prevention one could ask oneself whether the ex post penalty in tort for 
deliberate wrongdoing of Lucius should not be set at a punitive level to completely eradicate such 
wrongdoing. However, there is also an alternative line of enquiry which I set out to investigate in this paper: 
the role of injunctive relief in tort law. Designing mechanisms for injunctive relief in cases concerning 
deliberate torts was as daunting to the Romans as considering an overarching conception of injunctive relief 
in tort is to modern European legal systems. In order to better understand why such an overarching 
conception is still lacking, this article sets out to survey the French, German and English legal systems with 
respect to the role of injunction in tort law.  With the comparative analysis thus retained it may be possible 
to analyse the role of injunction in a particular set of cases, namely cases concerning wrongful risk-taking 
behaviour. This set may be apt to uncover force fields underlying tort and injunction. Take for instance an 
employer negligently in breach of an uncodified duty of care vis-à-vis his employees to refrain from exposing 
them to certain risks. Does such a breach warrant injunctive relief petitioned for by the employees?  And if 
so, under which conditions? And if not, what does that tell us about the nature of duties of care in tort? 
Admittedly, there seems to be little practical experience with injunctive relief in the set of cases I set out to 
investigate. Nevertheless, the implications of allowing or rejecting such claims are formidable. By granting 
petitions for injunctive relief, courts effectively convert ex post claims for compensation into primary duties 
to act or omit. By contrast, rejecting injunctive relief renders tort law rules into mere taxes on wrongful 
behaviour. Which of these two routes is chosen by courts and legislators and how forceful are the 
arguments used to support either choice? Drawing on the comparative analysis, I will attempt to identify the 
implications of sustaining and disallowing injunctive relief for [12] the understanding of tort law. If, indeed, 
allowing or rejecting claims for injunctive relief sheds light on tort law’s ends, perhaps a threefold 
conception of tort law is in order.  
As concerns the scope of this paper, it is understood that by no means does it present an overarching 
concept as referred to earlier. Moreover, four important complications are left untreated. First, no specific 
attention is devoted to the relationship in civil procedure between the summary procedure and main 
proceedings. Secondly, issues of convergence and coordination with other sources of law, notably regulatory 
law and criminal law, remain largely uncovered. Thirdly, issues of collective claims for injunction such as 
group litigation or collective litigation by interest groups and associations are excluded unless relevant for 
the subject of wrongful risk-taking. Fourthly, no attention is paid to the method of enforcement of 
                                                                
1
Holford-Strevens, Aulus Gellius - An Antonine Scholar and His Achievement, (OUP, 2005), p.127; Bloch, La cessation de 
l'illicite - Recherche sur une fonction méconnue de la responsabilité civile extracontractuelle (thèse Aix-Marseille III), 
(Dalloz 2008), p.19. 
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injunction judgements, for example, money penalties for non-compliance, l’astreinte, Ordnungsgeld, 
imprisonment, committal, or Ordnungshaft. 
 
§ 2. Tort and injunction; a comparative analysis 
a. Koziol’s puzzlement 
In a recent book discussing the Israeli Draft Civil Code, Austrian law professor Helmut Koziol discusses 
Section 366 of the Israeli Draft, which reads:  ‘Tort liability is liability for damage caused by wrongful conduct 
or liability for the conduct itself.’ Koziol is puzzled by the wording of this Section and he wonders how a 
person can be liable without having caused damage.
2
 He continues to argue that the Draft does not fit either 
the Israeli concept of tort law, or the continental European way of thinking, because: 
(…) it is almost generally accepted that the primary aim of tort law is the compensation of loss 
suffered by the victim. As far as I am aware, the widespread opinion is that injunctions are not a 
subject of tort law and that they need fewer requirements than claims for compensation. 
Koziol’s remark raises a number of interesting questions. Firstly, is the issue of injunction indeed not 
considered to be part of tort law, as Koziol suggests? And if so, what are they considered to be part of? 
Secondly, does it really matter for the relationship between tort law and injunction whether injunctive relief 
is in fact a part of tort law, or whatever part of the law? One could also pose the question whether 
injunctions in tort should ideally be considered to also be part and parcel of tort law. 
[13] It is not difficult to appreciate Koziol’s puzzlement, both from a common law and civil law perspective. 
Most legal systems in one way or another distinguish between the law of torts and damages as substantive 
law on the one hand and injunction, declaratory judgement, penalty payment and contempt of court  
(where applicable) as issues of procedural law on the other. From a conceptual point of view, however, the 
connecting points between substantive law and procedural law are obvious. One cannot obtain a judgment 
declaring that the defendant has acted wrongfully if there was actually no wrongful act from a substantive 
legal point of view.  Further,  prohibiting someone from acting wrongfully in the future is logically 
inconceivable, without first ascertaining wrongfulness of that (future) behaviour. That is, unless the law 
develops different categories of wrongfulness depending on the remedy sought, for example,  by 
distinguishing between categories of wrongful acts which are actionable per se and those that only give rise 
to a cause of action if damage is proven,or if it links injunctive relief to something else than wrongful 
behaviour.  
Hence, it is theoretically conceivable to consider prohibitory injunction as a totally separate response to 
infringement of property rights, which would link injunctive relief as a procedural sequel to ownership (actio 
negatoria, rei vindicatio) and would leave issues of wrongfulness untreated.  Comparably, injunctive relief 
for nuisance and slanderous communications could be construed as a form of relief for specific categories of 
tort, unavailable for other categories. These are undoubtedly practical ways to climb out of the labyrinth, 
but rather than climbing our way out, it seems more fruitful to consider how the labyrinth was built by 
taking a closer look from the inside.   
                                                                
2
 Koziol, 'Changes in Israeli Tort Law: A Continental European Perspective', in K. Siehr and R. Zimmermann (ed.) The Draft 
Civil Code for Israel in Comparative Perspective, (Mohr Siebeck,Tuebingen 2008) p. 142. Koziol considers the possibility 
that Sec. 366 of the Israeli Draft should be considered part of a legal system that allows the mere infringement of a right 
to give rise to tortious liability – irrespective of whether the infringer was at fault or the infringement had in fact caused 
damage. Koziol discusses and dismisses this possibility.  
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b. English law 
The role of injunction under English law can only properly be understood against the historical background 
of two divisions in the common law: on the one hand the division between torts actionable per se and torts 
actionable upon damage, and, on the other, the division between law and equity.  
The first division concerns two distinct categories of tort. Traditionally, certain categories of torts (torts 
actionable on proof of damage) were fundamentally construed as merely giving  a right to monetary 
compensation after the tort had been committed, rather than actual and direct protection against the 
infringement as such.
3
 Essentially, courts [14] at law were not considered to be enforcers of rights and 
protected interests but rather to be appliers of tariffs for committed wrongs. Other torts, however, were 
considered to be actionable per se – to be heard by courts of law without the need for evidence of damage.
4
 
This category includes such torts as trespass and defamation. These causes of action were held to provide 
legal protection to ‘interests considered fundamental to English society and the rule of law such as property, 
liberty and reputation’.
5
  
The second division concerns the distinction between law and equity. Here, an analogy between common 
law and Roman law can be made. In classical Roman law, omnis condamnatio est pecuniaria and only at a 
later stage did the practice of protecting interests by actually granting injunctive relief through praetorian 
interdicts develop.
6
 Likewise, the common law remedy for torts was pecuniary in form and therefore 
backward-looking by nature.
7
 In England and Wales, a more comprehensive ideal of actual protection 
against tortious behaviour was developed only in equity by courts with equitable jurisdiction.
8
 This 
protection could take the form of injunctive relief in equity where it would not be granted at law.  
Originally, injunctive relief was seen as an ultimum remedium to be administered only in cases where the 
available remedies at law were perceived as inadequate or inappropriate, for example, if the monetary 
damage was trivial but (repeated) infringement was nevertheless considered intolerable.
9
 The current 
                                                                
3
  See the overview presented by J. Steele, Tort law : Text, Cases, and Materials, (Oxford University Press, Oxford 2007), 
p. 8 ff; Cf. W. Rogers, Winfield & Jolowicz on Tort, (Sweet & Maxwell, London 2002), chapters 1-2; R. Stevens, Torts and 
Rights, (Oxford University Press, Oxford 2007), p. 284 et seq.; Varuhas, 'A Tort-Based Approach to Damages under the 
Human Rights Act 1998' (72), 5 Modern Law Review (2009), p. 766. See also Steele, 'Damages in tort and under the 
Human Rights Act: remedial or functional separation?' (67), 3 Cambridge Law Journal (2008), p. 607, referring to Watkins 
v. Secretary of State for the Home Department [2006] UKHL 17at [9] (Lord Bingham) and Van Colle v. Chief Constable of 
Hertfordshire Police; Smith v. Chief Constable of Sussex Police [2008] UKHL 50at [138] (Lord Brown). 
4
 Important to note is also that the range of damages available where such ‘vindicatory torts’ are involved, is much wider 
than where ‘compensatory torts’ such as negligence are involved. See fn. 3.  
5
 Varuhas, 5 Modern Law Review (2009), p. 765.  
6
 C. Bloch, La cessation de l'illicite - Recherche sur une fonction méconnue de la responsabilité civile extracontractuelle 
(thèse Aix-Marseille III, Dalloz, 2008), p. 8 et seq.; G. Wiesen, Zivilprozeßrechtliche Probleme der Unterlassungsklage, 
(EUL Verlag 2005), p. 32 et seq.; J. Fritzsche, Unterlassungsanspruch und Unterlassungsklage, (Springer, Wien 2000), p. 
15-16. Note, however, that the analogy between Roman and English law is far from perfect. The Romans in fact 
introduced a quasi-contractual penalty payment (‘poena sponsionis’) fining those who did not comply with the praetor-
ordered injunction, while the common law developed a more court-centred concept of ‘contempt of court’.  
7
 Cf. J. Martin, Modern Equity, (Sweet & Maxwell / Thomson Reuters, London 2009), p. 34. 
8
 I. Spry, The Principles of Equitable Remedies - Specific performance, injunctions, rectification and equitable remedies, 
(Thomson Legal & Regulatory / Sweet & Maxwell, London 2007), p. 322 et seq., p. 383; W. van Gerven et al., Cases, 
Materials and Texts on National, Supranational and International Tort Law (Ius Commune Casebook), (Hart, Oxford 
2000), p. 848. 
9
 Cf. I. Spry, The Principles of Equitable Remedies - Specific performance, injunctions, rectification and equitable remedies, 
p. 398 (‘In many situations where the threatened acts of the defendant are expected to be continuous or repeated the 
recovery of small or nominal damages is found not to provide sufficient protection. Sometimes, indeed, it is precisely in 
cases of this kind that the preventive action of a court of equity is most needed (…)’) 
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position is more balanced; the general test is whether it would be more just to grant an injunction than to 
award damages.
10
  
That said, two important features from the historical basis of injunctive relief in equity remain. The first 
feature is that injunction is fundamentally considered to be a [15]  discretionary power of the court and not 
a right of the claimant.
11
 In exercising this power, courts pay attention to the practicability of injunction in 
the given circumstances. This requires the balancing of risks and benefits in the light of the interests 
involved.
12
 Such balancing is especially apparent in case of prohibitory injunction aimed at averting potential 
wrongful risk-taking such as a quia timet injunction.  A qui timet injunction is conditional upon the weighing 
of factors such as the prospect of grave and irreversible harm,
13
 the balancing of the magnitude of the evil 
against the chances of its occurrence,
14
 proof of imminent danger of very substantial damage,
15
 as well as 
previous disregard of the rights of the claimant.
16
 
Moreover, in judging petitions for injunction, the court will consider the prospect of the court (and parties) 
being excessively burdened by recurring applications for orders and directions as to the execution of the 
order.
17
 This may lead the court to refuse the injunction or to ensure that the court order and its terms are 
expressed in as clear and unambiguous language as is reasonably possible.
18
 Ideally, the court order focuses 
on the required outcome rather than the process towards the outcome but depending on circumstances, a 
step-by-step guidance may have to be given.
19
  
All in all, courts seem to want to avoid excessively intervening in private relationships themselves and having 
parties immoderately rely on injunctive relief.
20
 Clearly, this dilemma requires a subtle weighing-process. A 
few examples may illustrate the extent to which English courts are willing to allow injunctive relief. In 
Redland Bricks Ltd. v Morris, the defendant brick company excavated a quarry and as a consequence the 
[16] neighbour’s land subsided onto the defendant’s land.
21
  It was likely that further damage would occur. 
Hence, the wrongful withdrawal of support had already taken place and the question was merely whether 
the claimant could get a mandatory injunction to prevent further damage. However, it was estimated that 
preventing further damage would cost as much as 35,000 GBP whereas the potential damage would not 
exceed 1,600 GBP.  A mandatory injunction was therefore denied.  
                                                                
10
 Ibid, p. 383; D. Bean, Injunctions, (Sweet & Maxwell, London 2010), p. 15 f. [2.02]. Note that this test allows for some 
level of competition rather than coordination between remedies at law and in equity.  
11
 Cf. the wording of section 37 of the Supreme Court Act 1981: ‘The High Court may by order (...) grant an injunction (...) 
in all cases in which it appears to the court to be just and convenient to do so’. Moreover, injunctions not merely serve 
to protect the claimant but can also serve to avoid interference with due process of the court (e.g. freezing orders, 
interlocutory and interim injunctions, and injunctions prohibiting oppressive or vexatious conduct). Hence, the generic 
category of injunction as such is firmly rooted in procedural rather than substantive law. 
12
 Cf. R. Heuston and R.Buckley, Salmond & Heuston on the Law of Torts, (Sweet & Maxwell, London 1996), p. 556 et seq. 
13
 Runnymede Borough Council v Ball [1986] 1 WLR 353. 
14
 Earl of Ripon v. Hobart [1834] 3 My. & K. 169at 176. 
15
 Fletcher v. Bealey [1885] 28 Ch. D. 688at 698. In this case it seems the court applied a test somewhat similar to the 
well known Learned Hand test (United States v. Carroll Towing Co. [1947] 159 F. 169); Cf. I. Spry, The Principles of 
Equitable Remedies - Specific performance, injunctions, rectification and equitable remedies, p. 379 f.; J. Martin, Modern 
Equity, p. 797 [25-007]; Murphy, 'Rethinking Injunctions in Tort Law' (27), 3 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies (2007), p. 
510. 
16
 I. Spry, The Principles of Equitable Remedies - Specific performance, injunctions, rectification and equitable remedies, 
p. 380. 
17
 Cf. Ibid p. 106; p. 543 et seq. 
18
 Ibid. 374; 545; J. Martin, Modern Equity, p. 799 [25-011]; See Redland Bricks Ltd. v Morris [1970] AC 652. 
19
 See Kennard v. Cory Brothers and Co. Ltd. [1922] 2 Ch. 1. 
20
 Cf. A. Ogus, Costs and Cautionary Tales - Economic Insights for the Law, (Hart Publishing, Oxford 2006), p. 80. 
21
 See I. Spry, The Principles of Equitable Remedies - Specific performance, injunctions, rectification and equitable 
remedies, p. 550. 
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In Wrotham Park Estate Co Ltd v Parkside Homes Ltd, the defendant put up houses in breach of a 
contractual clause against development. However, the value of the surrounding estate had not been 
reduced by the development. A mandatory restorative injunction was refused, as it was held that demolition 
of the houses would constitute a waste of much needed housing.
22
 Instead, the claimant was awarded an 
amount in damages equal to what he could reasonably have demanded prior to building, in return for 
waiving his rights under the clause.
23
  
In Miller v Jackson, a cricket club allowed balls to land on the claimants’ property. An injunction sought on 
the basis of nuisance and negligence was refused. The public interest in enabling the locals to enjoy outdoor 
recreation prevailed over the owners’ rights to quietly enjoy their properties (notwithstanding the owners’ 
right to compensation).
24
 This case seems to give authority to the inclusion of interests wider than those of 
the litigants in the weighing process.
25
 Contrastingly, in Kennaway v Thompson, a prohibitory injunction for 
nuisance caused by excessive noise from a motor boat racing club was partially granted, notwithstanding 
the interests of the public involved in the racing activities.
26
 This gives some credence to the proposition 
that, in judging claims for injunctive relief for nuisance, courts engage in a process of weighing the interests 
involved.
27
 
The second feature of injunction is that it is primarily considered to be an equitable remedy to support a 
legal right of a private individual rather than a sanction for wrongful behaviour. Indeed, in most of the cases 
mentioned earlier, a property right was involved.  If there is no legal right involved, the court may be more 
reticent in granting an  injunction.  For example, it was held that the owner of a house named ‘Ashford 
House’ did not have a legal right to the name and as a result, prohibitory injunction was denied. Equally, the 
husband of a pregnant woman seeking injunction against her plan to have an abortion [17] was held not to 
have a legal right ready for protection by injunction. From other case law, however, it seems that the 
concept of ‘legal right’ may be less than decisive. For instance, there is ample case law on the protection of 
obligations of confidentiality through injunction.
28
 
As far as injunction for breach of statutory duties is concerned, Gouriet v. Union of Post Office Workers 
shows the reluctance of English courts to give individuals a right to ‘specific performance’ in tort. In Gouriet 
v. Union of Post Office Workers, the issue before the court was whether an individual claimant should be 
granted an injunction compelling the defendant to perform a statutory duty. Postal workers’ unions 
announced that they would call on their members not to handle mail to South Africa for an entire week by 
way of anti-apartheid boycott. This boycott would contravene postal legislation which positively obliges 
postal workers not to wilfully delay or omit to deliver letters. An individual member of the public, Mr. 
Gouriet, initiated proceedings in his own name for mandatory injunction against the unions. One of the main 
questions was whether a statutory duty – enforceable by criminal law – could be alternatively enforced by 
individuals seeking injunction. Unmistakably, this was not merely an isolated issue of civil law and it 
deserved a holistic constitutional approach: can injunction be sought by individuals pursuing enforcement of 
statutory duties vis-à-vis the general public, or should this be a prerogative of public authorities with specific 
statutory powers? The House of Lords decided that Mr. Gouriet could not be granted injunctive relief, 
                                                                
22
 Wrotham Park Estate Co Ltd v Parkside Homes Ltd [1974] 1 WLR 798at 811 (Brightman J). 
23
 Pearce and Halson, 'Damages for Breach of Contract: Compensation, Restitution and Vindication', 1 Oxford Journal of 
Legal Studies (2008), p. 19 f.; See also A. Ogus, Costs and Cautionary Tales - Economic Insights for the Law, p. 202. 
24
 Miller v Jackson [1977] QB 966; Cf. J. Martin, Modern Equity, p. 854 f. [25-066]. 
25
 J. Martin, Modern Equity, p. 798 f. [25-010]. 
26
 Kennaway v Thompson [1981] QB 88. Cf; W. van Gerven et al., Cases, Materials and Texts on National, Supranational 
and International Tort Law, p. 856. 
27
 A. Ogus, Costs and Cautionary Tales - Economic Insights for the Law, p. 204 f. 
28
 See the cases referred to by J. Martin, Modern Equity, p. 804 f. 
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essentially because he could not show any particular interest or special damage.
29
 Hence, the mere fact that 
an individual expects to suffer damage by the breach of a statutory duty does not give rise to injunctive 
relief. However, if an individual claimant can show that the statutory duty was designed to protect a class of 
which he is a member, then the claimant has standing and injunction may be granted.
30
 
The discretionary nature of the court’s powers and the requirement of a legal right do not preclude, 
however, the procedure for injunction leaving its mark, or even moulding rights and duties under 
substantive law. In fact, it is sometimes said that English law is becoming more rights-based, making the 
vindicatory function of remedies increasingly [18] relevant.
31
 If true, this development may also herald a 
shift towards a more rights-based approach in injunction for negligent wrongdoing. Currently, however, this 
seems to be truer for contract law than for tort law. In the general area of negligence, there is still the 
dominant view that tortious liability in the tort of negligence is founded on the consequences of the act 
rather than on the act itself and that there is no free standing duty of care in negligence.
32
 It still seems to be 
conventional wisdom that there is only significance in the primary duty preceding the secondary obligation 
to compensate, if breach of the duty per se is actionable - as is the case with torts actionable per se.
33
 That 
said, statutory duties designed to protect specific interests do seem to be free standing and hence 
enforceable through injunction. This might indicate an increasing convergence of legal rights actionable per 
se and ‘legal interests’ traditionally not considered to be so.  
 
c. French law  
The French law of torts centres around the unitary concept of responsabilité pour faute. The concept of 
faute encapsulates both the wrongful act and mputability (l’illicéité et imputabilité) – although the French 
themselves would not spontaneously dissect their concept of faute into such elements.
34
 Indeed, it is 
precisely this lack of dissection that makes it difficult for French law to dovetail tort law with injunction.  
Article 1832 Code Civil (CC) is explicitly geared towards compensation and does not impose a direct 
prohibition of committing torts.  
This did not stop Planiol from theorizing that liability under Article 1382 presupposes a primary obligation to 
act or to refrain from acting and that liability is in fact the secondary, rather than the primary obligation.
35
  
                                                                
29
  Gouriet v. Union of Post Office Workers [1977] A.C. 435 (HL); Cf. Gouriet v. Union of Post Office Workers [1978] Q.B. 
729 (CA) at 770 per Lawton L.J., at 778 per Ormod L.J. ; See generally J. Martin, Modern Equity, p. 800 et seq. [25-013]; 
D. Bean, Injunctions, p. 62 [4.43];  A comparable issue arose before the French Cour de Cassation, where neighbours 
fought over a structure that had been erected by one of them in contravention of building regulation. The other filed for 
a mandatory injunction for demolition but since he did not suffer any damage or nuisance by the fact that the building 
was in violation of public law rules, the injunction was rejected; See Cour de Cassation Civ 2e, 18 décembre 2003, N° 02-
13092, Bulletin 2003 II N° 405 p. 335 ; RTDciv. 2004, p. 294 (note P. Jourdain); C. Bloch, La cessation de l'illicite - 
Recherche sur une fonction méconnue de la responsabilité civile extracontractuelle, p. 462 (footnote 1574). 
30
J. Martin, Modern Equity, p. 801 [25-013]; I. Spry, The Principles of Equitable Remedies - Specific performance, 
injunctions, rectification and equitable remedies, p. 539. 
31
 Pearce and Halson, 1 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies (2008), p. 1. 
32
 Overseas Tankship (UK) Ltd v Morts Dock and Engineering Co Ltd (the Wagon Mound) [1961] AC 388at 425 (Viscount 
Simonds); In Re T & N Ltd [2006] 1 WLR 1728at no. 25 (David Richards J); Cf. Pearce and Halson, 1 Oxford Journal of Legal 
Studies (2008); J. Murphy, 3 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies (2007), p. 520; See also Johnston v NEI International 
Combustion Ltd, [2007] 3 WLR 876 (‘the victim of the negligence must await events’ (Lord Scott at [67])) and Kuwait 
Airways Corp v Iraq Airways Corp, [2002] 2 AC 883(‘One cannot separate questions of liability from questions of 
causation. (...) One is never simply liable; one is always liable for something (...)’ (Lord Hoffmann at [128])). 
33
 Pearce and Halson, 1 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies (2008), p.16. 
34
 C. Bloch, La cessation de l'illicite - Recherche sur une fonction méconnue de la responsabilité civile extracontractuelle, 
p. 356 remarks that French lawyers would probably be surprised by the distinction. 
35
 Ibid. p. 285 et seq. 
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Others resisted this theory by arguing that uncodified primary duties (devoirs generaux) underlying Article 
1382, cannot be considered genuine obligations and that there are too much duties to properly categorize 
them. Recently, however, Bloch argued in support of Planiol that such devoirs logically precede the 
obligation to compensate and that French law should therefore better distinguish between l’illicéité and 
faute (the wrongful act and liability). Such a distinction would provide a better basis for injunctive relief in 
tort.
36
  
[19] Currently, French case law is not entirely clear on the necessary nexus between faute and injunction. In 
a recent decision, the Cour de Cassation had to deal with the following matter. The owner of a piece of land 
obtained a mandatory injunction against his neighbour to remove an illegal pigeon hunting post which was 
in violation with a ministerial order. The owner’s claim for compensation of damage, however, was rejected 
by the Court of Appeal of Pau because no wrongful nuisance was demonstrated. The Cour de Cassation 
found this reasoning flawed in the light of Article 1382 Code Civil:
37
 
 
Qu’en statuant ainsi, tout en déboutant par ailleurs M. X... 
de sa demande indemnitaire au motif que celui-ci ne 
démontrait avoir subi aucun préjudice du fait de la 
construction irrégulière des deux palombières de M. Y... Z... 
ni aucune gêne dans l’utilisation de ses propres 
palombières, la cour d’appel, qui n’a pas constaté 
l’existence d’un trouble excédant les inconvénients 
normaux du voisinage et qui a en outre exclu toute relation 
de causalité entre l’infraction à l’arrêté ministériel et un 
préjudice personnel quelconque de M. X... s’est contredite 
et a violé le texte susvisé ; 
(...) in so ruling, while dismissing Mr X’ claim for 
compensation on the grounds that he had not shown to 
have suffered any detriment because of the illegal 
construction of two dove hunting towers by mr. Y. .. Z. .. 
nor any discomfort in using his own towers, the appellate 
court, which had not established the existence of a 
nuisance exceeding the normal inconveniences of 
neighbourhood and had also ruled out any causal 
relationship between the breach of the ministerial order 
and any individual damage suffered by mr. X, has 
contravened and violated the aforementioned text; 
  
Clearly, this type of reasoning leaves French tort law with the fundamental question of whether l’illicite can 
really be considered the common denominator for injunctive relief.
38
 Rather, case law seems to frame 
(restorative) injunction as reparation in kind and therefore as damages rather than as a ‘genuine’ 
injunction.
39
  
Under French law, protection of legal rights (droits subjectifs) is traditionally at the forefront of injunctive 
relief but there is no rigid categorization of cases eligible for injunction.
 40
  Hence, injunction is also available 
in other tort areas, such as in the private enforcement of building regulation, neighbour disputes, freedom 
of expression and libel, unfair competition, employment disputes and industrial action.
41
 Indeed, Bloch in his 
                                                                
36
 Ibid. p. 350 et seq. 
37
 Cour de Cassation Civ 2e, 18 décembre 2003, N° 02-13092, Bulletin 2003 II N° 405 p. 335 ; RTDciv. 2004, p. 294 (note 
P. Jourdain). 
38
 C. Bloch, La cessation de l'illicite - Recherche sur une fonction méconnue de la responsabilité civile extracontractuelle, 
p.  287 et seq.; p. 294 et seq. 
39
 W. van Gerven et al., Cases, Materials and Texts on National, Supranational and International Tort Law, p. 862, p. 869; 
Otherwise, injunction is considered a discretionary interim relief tool in summary proceedings (Art. 809 Code de 
Procédure Civile):  ‘Le président peut toujours, même en présence d'une contestation sérieuse, prescrire en référé les 
mesures conservatoires ou de remise en état qui s'imposent, soit pour prévenir un dommage imminent, soit pour faire 
cesser un trouble manifestement illicite.’ [The president (of the tribunal) may always, even in case of serious challenge by 
the respondent, order interim measures conserving or freezing the current state of affairs to prevent imminent damage 
or to end a clearly wrongful disorderly situation.] 
40
 C. Bloch, La cessation de l'illicite - Recherche sur une fonction méconnue de la responsabilité civile extracontractuelle, 
p. 146 et seq. 
41
 Ibid. p. 157 et seq., p. 202 et seq. 
 www.professorvanboom.eu  9 
[20] recent study concludes that there is no logical reason for limiting injunctive relief to cases in which 
subjective property rights are involved.
42
 He concludes that the current wording of Article 1382 CC does not 
give sufficient credit to the fact that illicéité is at the heart of responsabilité pour faute and that a second 
sentence should be added to the article:
43
 
 
Indépendamment de la réparation du dommage 
éventuellement subi, le juge prescrit toutes les mesures qui 
s’imposent pour prévenir ou faire cesser le trouble illicite. 
Irrespective of compensation for the damage possibly 
suffered, the court shall order any such measures needed 
to prevent or stop the wrongful situation/nuisance. 
 
In the Avant-Projet Catala, however, the emphasis is put slightly differently. First, the Catala project 
considers injunctive relief to be a discretionary power of the court in tort cases rather than a logical stepping 
stone between illicéité and faute. Secondly, the Catala project works from the principle that prevention of 
damage is not a specific function of liability under tort law
44
 and that injunction, that is,  reparation in kind, 
may be a subsidiary measure rather than a right of the claimant.
45
 The Catala project provides: 
 
Chapitre III - Des effets de la responsabilité, Section 1 
Principes 
La réparation en nature 
Art. 1369  
Lorsque le juge ordonne une mesure de réparation en 
nature, celle-ci doit être spécifiquement apte à supprimer, 
réduire ou compenser le dommage. 
 
Art. 1369-1 
Lorsque le dommage est susceptible de s’aggraver, de se 
renouveler ou de se perpétuer, le juge peut ordonner, à la 
demande de la victime, toute mesure propre à éviter ces 
conséquences, y compris au besoin la cessation de 
l’activité dommageable. Le juge peut également autoriser 
la victime à prendre elle-même ces mesures aux frais du 
responsable. Celui-ci peut être condamné à faire l’avance 
des sommes nécessaires. 
Chapter III – Consequences of liability, Section 1 Principles 
Restoration in kind 
Art. 1369  
When the court orders a remedy in kind, it must be 
specifically suited to remove, reduce or compensate the 
damage. 
 
 
Art. 1369-1 
When the damage is likely to increase, to reoccur or to 
continue, the court  may order, at the request of the 
victim, any proper measure to prevent these 
consequences, including if necessary the ending of the 
harmful activity. 
The court may also allow the victim to take these 
measures himself on account of the liable party. The latter 
can be sentenced to advance the necessary funds. 
 
As far as French case law is concerned, there are some examples of injunction against wrongful risk-taking. 
Examples in which French courts awarded injunctive relief to mitigate risk to life, limb and property, include 
cases where a neighbour used wood [21] to build a wall, thus posing a risk of fire and where the defendant 
used scaffolding erected alongside a building, posing a risk of burglary. Relevant is also a recent case of a 
negligently constructed golf course causing danger to neighbouring property and the neighbours 
themselves. The dangers that the golf course posed were considered to go beyond the ‘troubles normeaux 
                                                                
42
 Ibid. p. 168. 
43
 Ibid. p. 256. 
44
 (ed.) (Ministère de la Justice, 2006), p. 168. 
45
 C. Bloch, La cessation de l'illicite - Recherche sur une fonction méconnue de la responsabilité civile extracontractuelle, 
p. 18-19. 
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du voisinage’ (the normal nuisance of neighbourhood) and the golf course operator was ordered by the Cour 
d'Appel Grenoble to reconstruct the fairway, bunker and hole no. 2.
46
 In a similar case, the Cour de Cassation 
held:
47
 
 
(...) attendu que l'arrêt retient que par suite d'un défaut de 
conception du tracé du golf la propriété de Mme X... était 
beaucoup plus exposée que les autres riverains à des tirs 
de forte puissance, et qu'il ressortait clairement de 
l'expertise que Mme X..., contrainte de vivre sous la 
menace constante d'une projection de balles qui devait se 
produire d'une manière aléatoire et néanmoins 
inéluctable, et dont le lieu et la force d'impact, comme la 
gravité des conséquences potentielles, étaient totalement 
imprévisibles, continuait à subir des inconvénients qui 
excédaient dans de fortes proportions ceux que l'on 
pouvait normalement attendre du voisinage d'un parcours 
de golf ; (...) de sorte qu'il convenait de faire application du 
principe général selon lequel l'exercice même légitime du 
droit de propriété devient générateur de responsabilité 
lorsque le trouble qui en résulte pour autrui dépasse la 
mesure des obligations ordinaires du voisinage ; (...) 
Given that the decision on appeal holds that due to 
defective design of the layout of the golf course the 
property of Mrs. X. .. was much more exposed than other 
residents to hard shots, and it was clear from the evidence 
that Ms. X. .., forced to live under the constant threat of a 
barrage of golf balls in a random yet inevitable way, whose 
location and impact as well as the severity of potential 
consequences was totally unpredictable, continued to 
suffer inconveniences substantially exceeding the level one 
could normally expect from living near a golf course; (...) 
therefore it was appropriate to apply the general principle 
that even the exercise of legitimate ownership leads to 
liability when the nuisance/condition resulting to others 
exceeds the ordinary burdens of the neighbourhood; (...) 
 
Note that in the golf course cases the courts allowed injunction for certain risks, which is different from 
allowing injunction for uncertain risks. The former seems to be merely an application of a Learned-Hand 
based approach while the latter would amount to application of the precautionary principle.
48
 
 
d. German law 
The position of the German Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch (BGB) is comparable to Article 1382 of the French Code 
Civil in the sense that the wording of § 823 BGB is primarily concerned with compensation for wrongs. In 
other words, the BGB does not contain a [22] direct prohibition against committing torts.
49
 Neither the 
German Civil Code (BGB) nor the Code of Civil Procedure (Zivilprozessordnung; ZPO) contains general rules 
on injunction.
50
 As a result, the German courts had to develop a system of injunctive relief in civil cases. The 
development of injunctive remedies was helped by the existence of the so-called actio negatoria, the 
injunctive relief ancillary to the revindicatio and neighbour disputes.
51
 Nowadays, a more or less general 
framework for injunctive relief can be found in § 887, § 888 and § 890 ZPO. These Articles merely refer to 
                                                                
46
 CA Grenoble 1re ch. Civ., 22 mai 2000, JCP 11 avril 2001, no. 15-16, no. IV 1 717, p. 787  (SA Golf d’Albon v. Vachier). 
47
 Cour de Cassation Civ. 2e, 10 juin 2004, P. no. 03-10434, RTD Civ 2004, p. 738 with comment P. Jourdain (societé 
Massane Loisirs v. Groupama), approving CA Montpellier 5 nov 2002, JD no 241093. 
48
 Cf. C. Bloch, La cessation de l'illicite - Recherche sur une fonction méconnue de la responsabilité civile 
extracontractuelle, p. 462 f. 
49
 Id 95. 
50
 G. Wiesen, Zivilprozeßrechtliche Probleme der Unterlassungsklage, p. 47. 
51
 § 907 BGB (prohibitory injunction against neighbour in case of certainty of future cross-border damage), § 908 BGB 
(mandatory injunction in case of imminent collapse of adjacent building), § 1004 BGB (prohibitory injunction against 
infringement of property right).  
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injunctive relief concerning a ‘Verpflichtung’ (a duty) – which can be anything ranging from ending wrongful 
emissions and remedying humidity problems, to making a dog stop barking:
52
 
 § 887 
(1) Erfüllt der Schuldner die Verpflichtung nicht, eine 
Handlung vorzunehmen, deren Vornahme durch einen 
Dritten erfolgen kann, so ist der Gläubiger von dem 
Prozessgericht des ersten Rechtszuges auf Antrag zu 
ermächtigen, auf Kosten des Schuldners die Handlung 
vornehmen zu lassen. 
(2) Der Gläubiger kann zugleich beantragen, den Schuldner 
zur Vorauszahlung der Kosten zu verurteilen, die durch die 
Vornahme der Handlung entstehen werden, unbeschadet 
des Rechts auf eine Nachforderung, wenn die Vornahme 
der Handlung einen größeren Kostenaufwand verursacht. 
(3) (...) 
 
§ 888 
(1) Kann eine Handlung durch einen Dritten nicht 
vorgenommen werden, so ist, wenn sie ausschließlich von 
dem Willen des Schuldners abhängt, auf Antrag von dem 
Prozessgericht des ersten Rechtszuges zu erkennen, dass 
der Schuldner zur Vornahme der Handlung durch 
Zwangsgeld und für den Fall, dass dieses nicht 
beigetrieben werden kann, durch Zwangshaft oder durch 
Zwangshaft anzuhalten sei. Das einzelne Zwangsgeld darf 
den Betrag von 25.000 Euro nicht übersteigen. Für die 
Zwangshaft gelten die Vorschriften des Vierten Abschnitts 
über die Haft entsprechend. 
(2) Eine Androhung der Zwangsmittel findet nicht statt. 
(3) Diese Vorschriften kommen im Falle der Verurteilung 
zur Leistung von Diensten aus einem Dienstvertrag nicht 
zur Anwendung. 
 
§ 890 
(1) Handelt der Schuldner der Verpflichtung zuwider, eine 
Handlung zu unterlassen oder die Vornahme einer 
Handlung zu dulden, so ist er wegen einer jeden 
Zuwiderhandlung auf Antrag des Gläubigers von dem 
Prozessgericht des ersten Rechtszuges zu einem 
Ordnungsgeld und für den Fall, dass dieses nicht 
beigetrieben werden kann, zur Ordnungshaft oder zur 
Ordnungshaft bis zu sechs Monaten zu verurteilen. Das 
einzelne Ordnungsgeld darf den Betrag von 250.000 Euro, 
die Ordnungshaft insgesamt zwei Jahre nicht übersteigen. 
(2) Der Verurteilung muss eine entsprechende Androhung 
vorausgehen, die, wenn sie in dem die Verpflichtung 
aussprechenden Urteil nicht enthalten ist, auf Antrag von 
dem Prozessgericht des ersten Rechtszuges erlassen wird. 
(3) (...) 
§ 887 
(1) If the debtor does not meet his duty to undertake an 
action that can be undertaken by a third party, the creditor 
shall, on request, be authorized by the court of first 
instance to perform the action at the expense of the 
debtor.  
(2) The creditor may also petition for the debtor to 
advance the costs that will be incurred in the performance 
of the act, notwithstanding the right to be reimbursed 
later if the performance of the act causes greater 
expenses.  
 
(3) (...)  
 
§ 888  
(1) If an act cannot be done by another person, that is, if it 
depends solely on the will of the debtor, the court of first 
instance may order that the debtor is coerced to perform 
the act through penalty payments and in case these 
payments can not be recovered is coerced by penalty or 
coercive confinement (Zwangshaft) . 
The payment per case shall not exceed the amount of 
25,000 euros. For the compulsory detention of the 
provisions of the Fourth Section on detention shall apply 
accordingly.  
 
(2) There is no prior notification of coercion. 
  
(3) These rules do not apply in case of a conviction for the 
provision of services from a service contract. 
 
 
§ 890  
(1) If the debtor acts contrary to his duty to refrain from an 
act or refuse to carry out an action, he shall on request of 
the creditor be convicted by the court of first instance to 
pay a penalty for reason of infringement and in the event 
that this penalty cannot be recovered, to detention or 
imprisonment up to six months. The payment per case 
shall not exceed the amount of 25,000 euros, the order of 
detention shalle not exceed a total of two years.  
 
(2) The conviction must be preceded by an appropriate 
notification, which, if it is not included in the verdict 
expressing the duty, shall be issued by the court of first 
instance.  
 
(3) (...) 
                                                                
52
 Cf. H. Thomas and H. Putzo, Zivilprozessordnung Kommentar, (Beck, München 2008), § 887 - § 890. 
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[23] The historical development of injunction in German civil law was briefly as follows. Throughout the 19
th
 
century, German courts were anxious that issuing an injunction could have catastrophic consequences for 
the business involved. This prompted them to carefully consider whether compensatory damages was not 
the preferable option in nuisance cases.
53
 On the other hand, injunction orders were used increasingly in 
protecting ‘immaterial rights’ such as name, honour and ‘the right to undisturbed exploitation of established 
and operative business’.
54
  
The German Reichsgericht (1901) first approached the issue of injunction by connecting actions for damages 
with actions for injunction, by holding that cases that were actionable for damages were also actionable for 
prohibitory injunction.
55
 The Court’s reasoning was criticized for failing to distinguish retrospective from 
prospective remedies,
56
 but it did help German doctrine to better express the conditions for injunctive relief 
subsequently. For instance, the labelling of ‘unlawfulness’ and ‘fault’ in the tort provisions of the BGB was 
subsequently used to compare and distinguish [24] retrospective and prospective remedies. ‘Unlawfulness’ 
of behaviour in view of legally protected interests could thus be considered both retrospectively and 
prospectively, as in both cases the breach of a duty to respect the legally protected interest was at the heart 
of the remedy. From this doctrinal reasoning came the conclusion that ‘fault’ could only be relevant for 
judging past breaches and not for injunction orders to the extent that these dealt with future breaches.
57
 
It was only in 1905 that the Reichsgericht considered the relationship between injunction and enforcement 
of Rechte and Rechtsgüter (subjective rights and interests protected by statute) by holding that any right 
and protected interest was worthy of protection by prohibitory injunction.
58
 As a result, currently injunctive 
relief is also granted currently  for breach of statutory duties if the statute aims at protecting the interests of 
the claimant.
59
  
In current German doctrine, the general category Abwehransprüche is subdivided into Unterlassungsklagen 
(prohibitory injunction aimed at refraining from infringement; § 890 ZPO), quasi-negatorische 
Beseitigungsklagen (mandatory injunction aimed at either ending infringement or positive restorative action 
for the application of § 249 BGB, § 887 and 888 ZPO.
60
  
Legal doctrine has extensively debated the nature of injunctive relief in general. Some scholars consider 
injunctive relief merely a procedural phenomenon without conveying any legal rights on the claimant. 
However, the majority of legal authors argue that ‘substantive rights of action or omission’ underlie every 
type of injunctive relief.  
The separation of conditions for injunction and compensation has also led to the assertion that a claim for 
damages in tort is logically dependent on the pre-existence of a duty to act or omit.  This is the Planiol 
argument.
61
 As a consequence, claims concerning compensation are distinguished from those concerning 
                                                                
53
 G. Wiesen, Zivilprozeßrechtliche Probleme der Unterlassungsklage, p. 48 f. 
54
 Ibid. p. 49 et seq. In 1896, the Gesetz gegen unlauteren Wettbewerb (Act against Unfair Competition) was enacted, 
introducing specific stopping orders enforceable by criminal penalties. 
55
 Ibid. p. 54. 
56
 Ibid. p. 16 et seq. 
57
 Cf. W. van Gerven et al., Cases, Materials and Texts on National, Supranational and International Tort Law, p. 857. 
58
 G. Wiesen, Zivilprozeßrechtliche Probleme der Unterlassungsklage,p. 56. 
59
 W. van Gerven et al., Cases, Materials and Texts on National, Supranational and International Tort Law, p. 860. 
60
 G. Wiesen, Zivilprozeßrechtliche Probleme der Unterlassungsklage, p. 6 et seq.,p. 19; W. van Gerven et al. , Cases, 
Materials and Texts on National, Supranational and International Tort Law, p. 856. 
61
 Kocher, 'Feststellungswirkungen von Unterlassungs- und Schadensersatzurteilen' (117), 4 Zeitschrift für Zivilprozess 
(2004), p. 494; G. Wiesen, Zivilprozeßrechtliche Probleme der Unterlassungsklage, p. 64 et seq.; J. Fritzsche, 
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injunction. Two cases may illustrate this. First, there is the Faxkarte case concerning alleged infringement of 
copyright of a computer application.
62
 The legal issue involved was whether a court [25] decision rejecting a 
claim for compensation has res judicata effect between the litigants in a subsequent procedure for 
prohibitory injunctive relief.  The Bundesgerichtshof reasoned that although the facts underlying the claim 
for prohibition – past infringement of the rights of the claimant – may be identical to the facts that were 
earlier deemed insufficient for sustaining a claim for compensation in tort, the acts targeted are different: 
the claim for compensation relates to past acts whereas the claim for prohibitory injunction concerns future 
acts. Moreover, the two claims offer different forms of protection and this may bring the defendant to 
display distinct behaviour in defending either claim.  He may be more interested in putting up a defence 
against one claim than against the other. For these reasons, elements of the claim decided in one procedure 
have no res judicata effect in the other procedure.  
The second case concerned the extinction of claims for injunction. In  a 1990, decision the 
Bundesgerichtshof held that the right to apply for injunctive relief by designated consumer associations 
under the 1976 General Contract Terms Act was not a procedural remedy sui generis, but a substantive right 
pursuant to § 194 of the German Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch.  This meant that as such, the right to injunctive 
relief was considered to be subject to prescription and estoppel.
63
  
It seems that the concept of injunction as the procedural materialization of substantive legal rights to action 
or omission by the defendant can be traced back to Savigny and Windscheid, who helped to distinguish 19
th
 
century German law from Roman law. Roman law itself did little to distinguish substantive rights from 
procedural actions. By imbuing German scholarship with the concept of subjective rights, Savigny and 
Windscheid were seminal in conceptualizing injunctive relief as the procedural side of a genuine right to 
action or omission.
64
 Perhaps this also explains why German law has succeeded better in dovetailing tort law 
and injunctive relief than English law, as the common law still seems to be in the middle of a process of 
defining the law of torts as a rights-based system.  
The use of injunctive relief in German tort law is twofold: injunction serves to protect subjective rights such 
as property (‘geschützter Rechtspositionen’) and to legally enforce arranged duties to behave in a certain 
way (i.e. statutory duties and uncodified duties of care enforceable under § 823 et seq. BGB).
65
 Hence, in 
theory it can be used to stop wrongful risk-taking from causing harm. In practice, though, there are some 
obstacles. For prospective injunction, danger of occurrence, or reoccurrence, is relevant.
66
 Imminent danger 
that the wrongful act will occur is usually the yardstick used.
67
 In case of danger of reoccurrence, however, a 
certain reversal of the burden of proof can be [26] applied. Another issue that may be relevant is the 
precision of the verdict. To the extent that an injunction is aimed at future acts, describing such acts may be 
difficult as these by nature are more diffuse and hence more difficult to delineate.
68
 This brings courts to 
                                                                                                                                                                                                   
Unterlassungsanspruch und Unterlassungsklage, p. 114 ff; Cf. French law, C. Bloch, La cessation de l'illicite - Recherche 
sur une fonction méconnue de la responsabilité civile extracontractuelle, p. 290. 
62
 Faxkarte BGHZ 150, 377 (Bundesgerichtshof 2 May 2002) at 383; Cf. E. Kocher, 4 Zeitschrift für Zivilprozess (2004), at 
p. 489; See also Brunova [1974] GRUR 99 (Bundesgerichtshof 28 September 1990) at 101 (separate limitation periods for 
a claim holding both mandatory positive injunction and prohibitory injunction). 
63
 [1990] ZIP 511 (Bundesgerichtshof 21 February 1990) at 512. 
64
 G.Wiesen, Zivilprozeßrechtliche Probleme der Unterlassungsklage, p. 71 et seq. 
65
 J. Fritzsche, Unterlassungsanspruch und Unterlassungsklage, p. 111. 
66
 G. Wiesen, Zivilprozeßrechtliche Probleme der Unterlassungsklage, p. 89 et seq.; J. Fritzsche, Unterlassungsanspruch 
und Unterlassungsklage, p. 178 et seq. 
67
 J. Fritzsche, Unterlassungsanspruch und Unterlassungsklage, p. 179. 
68
 Cf. Kocher, 4 Zeitschrift für Zivilprozess (2004), p. 492. 
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carefully consider and phrase orders granting a prohibitory injunction and it also indicates that such orders 
are in inherent need of construction.
69
  
An example drawn from German case law may illustrate the difficulties for courts to consider injunction for 
wrongful risk-taking. The owner of a house with a garden noticed that his garden drew considerable 
attention from small children in his neighbourhood. Although he had secured his garden with a fence, 
children from time to time nevertheless succeeded in entering the garden. Quite a number of these stray 
children fell in the pond. For this reason, the parents feared that the pond would sooner or later cause some 
harm to the children of the neighbourhood. The parents petitioned the court on the basis of wrongful risk-
taking by the pond owner for a mandatory injunction to implement precautions, for example, better 
fencing.
70
 As such, a mandatory injunction is feasible under German law. But how specific may the court be? 
May it merely order outcome or is it also allowed to formulate the positive duty and how it should be 
executed?
71
 Admittedly, this is a difficult issue as some legal systems would find a court order that merely 
describes the outcome as too vague to impose legally enforceable duties.
72
 
 
§ 3. Comparative notes 
As Kennett rightly noted, ‘enforcement laws are deeply embedded in national histories and cultures, and lie 
at the intersection of many different areas of substantive law’, which make them potentially resistant to 
comparison (let alone harmonization).
73
  So the previous comparative overview was merely a first attempt 
at comparing different styles of enforcement in tort law. The overall conclusion is that injunctive relief for 
wrongful risk-taking is underdeveloped in the legal systems reviewed earlier. Whether that is deplorable or 
not is a matter for later discussion. What is interesting here is that at first sight the legal systems seem to 
have different levels of rigidity in dealing with injunction [27] as a remedy, both in terms of legal practice 
and dogmatic structure. As far as practice is concerned, use of civil injunction is predominantly made in 
competition law, intellectual property law, unfair commercial practices, neighbour law, labour disputes, 
privacy, anti-social behaviour and domestic violence (occupation and non-molestation orders).
74
 
As far as the differences between legal systems are concerned, it has been said that German courts are less 
reticent in allowing mandatory injunction than English courts and that the latter show a clear preference for 
damages.
75
 With regard to wrongful risk-taking, examples are scarce in either jurisdiction. If anything , this 
renders it impossible to draw firm conclusions. As far as rigidity in structure is concerned, it seems that 
jurisdictions such as the German one, with a dogmatic distinction between wrongfulness and imputability, 
have an easier job fitting in injunctive relief in their concept of tort law than those that work with unitary 
                                                                
69
 Cf. Ibid. 493; G. Wiesen, Zivilprozeßrechtliche Probleme der Unterlassungsklage, p. 146 et seq. For rules of 
construction of prohibitory injunctive orders under German law; see Jubiläumsschnäppchen [2001] Neue Juristische 
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73
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concepts such as faute and the tort of negligence that stress the outcome of the act  rather than the act 
itself.
76
 
On a general level, however, these differences in structure, use and extent of injunction in tort law offer a 
more profound insight into the role of the judiciary in tort law.  As noted by Damaska and Kessler,
77
 the 
organisation of state authority and the prevailing conception of what purposes such authority should serve, 
in part explain the shape that methods of dispute resolution take in a particular jurisdiction. This is also true 
for enforcement mechanisms in private law. Take for instance penalty payments available in some 
jurisdictions (Zwangsgeld, l’astreinte, dwangsom) as an instrument for prodding the defendant to comply 
with a prohibitory or mandatory injunction: for each day the defendant is in violation of the court-ordered 
injunction he will forfeit an amount in money.  The interesting curiosity here is that in some jurisdictions, the 
penalty payment flows into the public purse whereas in other jurisdictions it flows into the claimant’s purse. 
It can be argued that these differences between jurisdictions tell us something about the perceived role of 
judicial authority and the role the judiciary plays in civil disputes. Moreover, it can be maintained that by 
allowing claimants to collect and keep the penalty payment, the legislature may want to signal to citizens 
that the judge is not the key player in the procedure and that the function of the judiciary in civil law is more 
a provider of adjudicatory services to the public rather than the enforcement agent vested with exclusive 
state powers. In any event, it seems plausible that the shape, form and extent of injunctive relief in a given 
legal system signals how that legal system perceives [28] litigants, courts, and the relationship between 
procedural law and substantive private law. This underscores the observation that it would be misleading to 
separate tort law systems from the procedural environment in which they operate.
78
 
From this perspective, it may be argued that the stance of the judiciary in petitions for injunction against 
wrongful risk-taking can reveal something about the core of tort law. We all acknowledge that in practice, 
tort law provides monetary compensation for wrongs causing harm. That is what it does, but what does it 
aim at? Why would it want to compensate? One could easily assess that monetary compensation is merely a 
remedy and as such cannot be considered a goal of tort law. Surely, tort law must be about more than 
compensating for compensation’s sake. Indeed, tort theorists put forward laudable goals behind the remedy 
of compensation, such as restorative justice, vindication of rights, etc.   
In practice, some legal systems explicitly define tort law in terms of a legal institution aimed at protecting 
specifically identified interests against infringements, such as the German unitary idea of tort. Others work 
from the central idea that tort law is to protect against wrongful behaviour in general,for example, the 
French idea of tort.  Again other legal systems, such as the common law, hold a middle position by 
categorising some torts as primarily protection of rights (torts actionable per se) and others as merely giving 
rise to compensation for damage after the event as is the case with the tort of negligence. To some extent, 
legal systems adhering to a rights-based approach in tort law (ubi ius, ibi remedium) could be expected to 
approach the foundations of injunctive relief differently from legal systems historically based on a semi-
closed list of writs and remedies. The former could be expected to consider injunctive relief to be one of the 
claimant’s remedies defining his substantive right to action or omission, whereas the latter could be 
expected to consider injunctive relief to be a court prerogative based on autonomous criteria which may or 
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may not coincide with one or more of the conditions for liability in tort. Hence, the rights-based approach 
will by necessity look for foundation of the injunction in the substantive right. In this approach, the 
injunction is a remedy in tort and as such cannot go beyond the scope of the right. In other words:  
The close link between right and remedy lies in the fact that a right must necessarily give rise to a 
remedy which allows the right to be enforced through the judicial process, which actually means 
that the “constitutive” conditions of the remedy should be the same as the “substantive law” 
conditions for the underlying right to arise.
79
  
[29] Typically, the remedy cannot go beyond what the right necessitates, nor should it provide less than 
what the right requires. An example drawn from Dutch law may illustrate this point. A listed building was 
ruined by fire. The owner of the scorched building decided to tear it down and to remove the remains, 
which was in contravention with applicable regulations. A positive mandatory injunction for complete 
restoration was requested by a foundation acting in the common interest. However, since the owner merely 
destroyed an already ruined building, the court held that the owner could only be held to restore the 
previous dilapidated and ruined state. Consequently, the injunction was rejected as being too broadly 
phrased.
80
 This reveals a dichotomy. On the one hand, injunction is considered part of tort law as one 
remedy to vindicate rights and/or stop and prevent wrongdoing, while on the other hand it is thought to be 
a separate set of procedural tools incidentally touching but not necessarily connecting with substantive tort 
law. 
 
§ 4. Towards a threefold taxonomy of risk-taking in tort 
In this final section, I address the issue of the influence of a given legal system’s perception of the functions 
of tort law on the relationship between tort and injunction. If a tort law system considers the claimant to 
have a right not to be subjected to the dangers caused by wrongful risk-taking, then injunction is a pre-
emptive remedy sustaining that right. Logically speaking, this rights-based approach has much to commend 
it. When courts assess behaviour in a tort case and establish that the defendant was under a duty of care 
vis-à-vis the claimant for negligently failing to fulfil  his duty and that the ensuing damage was in fact caused 
by wrongful risk-taking, then the behaviour is evaluated according to an ex tunc normative standard. Others 
have convincingly argued that it is logically impossible to state that someone’s behaviour fell short of the 
behaviour that he could have been expected to display, without acknowledging that a certain standard of 
conduct applied at the moment of the act.
81
 In other words: logic demands that duty precedes liability for 
wrongful risk-taking.  It is not inconceivable, however, to conceptualize liability for risk-taking as not being 
preceded by a duty. To explore this possibility, which may enable us to better align tort law and injunction, 
we need to distinguish three forms of risk-taking in tort.
82
  [30] 
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Category 1 
Firstly, there are injuries caused by risk-taking which are left uncompensated, for example, because the 
injured party is considered to be the unfortunate victim of ‘daily’ or ‘ubiquitous’ risks. In these cases, the 
loss remains where it falls and others are not considered to bear responsibility even though they may well 
be causally related (in part) to creating the risk.  This is the case in certain nuisances that are considered 
‘bearable’ or ‘acceptable’.  
Category 2 
Secondly, there are those injuries which are compensated through the tort law system by assigning liability 
for the inherent but socially acceptable dangers of a certain activity.  In such cases, the policy choice of a 
legislature or court to grant compensation, although the activity itself is deemed acceptable, may be based 
on the idea that the benefits of reducing the risk level by improving the care level do not outweigh the costs 
thereof, provided such improvement is possible at all. Compensation for the so-called ‘residual losses’ 
caused by this ‘acceptable risk-taking’ is then deemed appropriate.
 83
 What this entails, however, is that in 
principle injunction is denied. 
Category 3 
Thirdly, there are injuries which are compensated through the tort system because they were the result of 
wrongful risk-taking, such as the irresponsible omission to take precautionary measures by the person 
responsible for the source of danger, for example owners, users, or operators. This is the area where tort 
law compensates for reasons of negligence or wrongful infringement of protected interests. Such negligence 
or infringement constitutes unacceptable risk-taking, giving rise to both compensatory damages and 
injunctive relief.   
In two specific cases, however, injunction may be denied. The first exception arises when the court, in 
weighing the interests of the claimant, defendant and other interests in light of a future remedy of 
compensation, finds that it would be unacceptably burdensome for the defendant to comply with the duty. 
The duty not to engage in unacceptable risk-taking may thus be converted into a category 2 case. The 
second exception arises when the court in weighing the interests of the claimant and the defendant, in light 
[31] of the availability of the retrospective remedy of compensation,  finds that it would be unacceptably 
burdensome for the defendant to comply with a duty concerning a restorative injunction.
84
 
Clearly, categories 1 and 2 include acceptable risks, whereas category 3 consists of unacceptable and 
therefore wrongful risk-taking behaviour. Mandatory and prohibitive injunction orders come into play in 
category 3 while remaining inapplicable in categories 1 and 2. Obviously, the difference between categories 
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2 and 3 is the most relevant for our discussion. If in a specific case a court allows a claim for compensation 
but denies, ceteris paribus, the claim for injunction, then this may be a category 3 case. Therefore, it would 
be interesting to know how courts would react to the following two hypotheticals. The first hypothetical 
involves an employee who is continuously exposed to a noxious substance. On average, the substance is 
known to cause serious adverse health effects in 1% of the population of exposed employees. Before the 
danger materializes, the employee seeks prohibitory injunction. The second hypothetical involves school 
children running a 1 % risk while attending their school, of inhaling a fatal asbestos fiber and consequently 
developing mesothelioma after some 30 years. Assume that there is no public law regulation applicable in 
such as case.  Would the court grant injunction petitioned by any of the children (or their legal 
representatives) ordering the school to remove the asbestos source or to provide an alternative school 
building? 
It may be suggested that although no risk has yet materialised, French, German and English courts alike 
would grant injunctive relief nevertheless, even though the cases do not involve breach of statutory duties, 
but merely constitute a breach of uncodified duties of care not to take excessive risks concerning the health 
of others. Having said that, in view of the reported uncertainties surrounding injunctive relief, I am not 
entirely confident that injunction would be granted across the board.
85
 If indeed an injunction were not to 
be granted while the court would award damages if – all other things being equal – the danger eventually 
materialized, then apparently the risk-taking as such is not ‘wrongful’ in the sense in which I have used that 
term here. In that case, the liability cannot be founded on the breach of a duty not to expose the claimant to 
the risk. In effect, the foundation of liability would be ‘acceptable risk-taking, subject to an obligation to 
compensate the residual losses’. 
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